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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In federal employment discrimination law, courts apply the label 
“cat’s paw” to describe certain cases. Judge Richard Posner first used the 
term cat’s paw in the context of federal discrimination jurisprudence, 
invoking a fable about an enterprising monkey who tricks a cat into getting 
hot chestnuts from a fire.1  As the cat removes the hot chestnuts from the 
fire, the monkey eats them, leaving the cat with nothing except burnt paws. 
 
*Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This 
article is part of a symposium to honor Professor Charlie Sullivan. Charlie has truly created 
and nurtured a community of scholars. Personally, I remain grateful for Charlie’s work in 
creating structures to support junior faculty, which greatly influenced my early work and 
continues to influence my scholarship today.  In addition to his own significant 
contributions to the literature in employment discrimination and employment law, Charlie 
has always been a generous, enthusiastic and careful reader for others in the field. I want to 
thank my research assistant Blythe McGregor for pulling cases and articles for this piece. 
 1  Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). I note at the outset 
Professor Sullivan’s concerns about the narrowness of any legal inquiries, whether based on 
fables or not. Charles A. Sullivan, Is There A Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other 
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1080 (2014) (“any 
legal inquiry can draw on only a limited number of concepts, and there is a natural tendency 
to analogize to concepts with which the attorney or judicial mind is familiar. It may be that 
the tendency can be overdone . . .”). 
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In its traditional form, a cat’s paw case is one in which a biased 
individual passes along negative information about a worker to an 
“unbiased” decisionmaker.2  The “unbiased” decisionmaker then takes a 
negative action against the worker based on the information provided.  
Although the cat’s paw metaphor appears to be an easy way to describe a 
subset of discrimination cases, the term has grown beyond this descriptive 
function.  There is now an entire body of employment discrimination law 
built around the cat’s paw concept. 
This Article explores cat’s paw as a metaphor.  It argues that courts 
should abolish the metaphor for three main reasons.  First, cat’s paw does 
not function well as a metaphor.  Other than providing a clever turn of 
phrase, cat’s paw does not perform any of the traditional functions of 
metaphor.  The concept of cat’s paw does not make an abstract principle 
more concrete.  It does not provide fresh insights about discrimination law.3  
It does not make law more accessible by allowing lay readers to better 
understand the law.4  Indeed, most people have never encountered the fable 
that underlies cat’s paw. 
Second, cat’s paw does not promote reasoning by analogy.  It is 
unable to perform this function because the cat’s paw fable does not 
describe what is happening in discrimination cases. The fable portrays two 
actors (a monkey and a cat) who have no legal relationship to one another 
and are not imbedded within a larger organization.  The monkey is acting 
for his own personal gain and is not constrained or emboldened by the 
formal policies and informal norms of a larger organization. 
 
 2  I use the term “unbiased” in quotes to reflect the idea that the decisionmaker is not 
overtly motivated by animus based on a protected trait.  However, this construct is 
problematic on a number of fronts. First, it suggests that employment decisions are discrete 
acts that take place after one decision is made. However, in some instances, a decision 
develops over time with multiple inputs. Second, using the term bias elevates the required 
standard for liability.  The federal employment discrimination statutes require causation, and 
not intent.  However, causation can be proven through evidence of intent.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (using word “because”). 
 3  Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors 
in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20 (1994).  This Article is not trying to make 
any technical claim about the definition of metaphor compared to other rhetorical devices, 
such as analogy.  Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748 
n.26 (1993).  The problem of metaphor is not unique to discrimination law.  See, e.g., Orin 
S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 359–62 (2003); 
Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and 
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241 (1995) (analyzing 
the applicability of the physician-fiduciary metaphor in the context of a changing health care 
system); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, 
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (1993) (describing how 
metaphors of trust and betrayal influence the availability of extracontractual damages in 
breach of contract cases). 
 4  Robert L. Tsai, Democracy’s Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006).   
SPERINO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020  12:32 PM 
2020] KILLING THE CAT’S PAW 1305 
Unfortunately, the fable does not even relate to the two most 
important actors in discrimination cases: the worker and the employer.  
They are simply not part of the idea that the fable conveys.  Perhaps most 
striking, in the fable, the monkey gets away with his mischief.  The overall 
tale told by the cat’s paw fable is that a wrongdoer suffers no consequence 
for his actions. This does not seem like an appropriate idea to guide federal 
discrimination law. 
Finally, employment discrimination as a field has suffered greatly by 
using cat’s paw.  Even though the pitfalls of judging by metaphor are well-
known, judges have not been careful in using cat’s paw.5  In many cases, 
judges have inserted aspects of the cat’s paw fable when describing the 
legal standard for proving employment discrimination. Rather than looking 
to the statutory language or purpose for meaning, the judges view the limits 
of liability through the fable instead.  This happens even though the fable 
introduces concepts that are not required to adjudicate discrimination 
claims. 
The consequences of this loose analysis are far-reaching.  The cat’s 
paw concept has been used in hundreds of cases.  Courts have applied cat’s 
paw analysis under a wide range of federal statutes including Title VII, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and others.6 
Professor Alexander Bickel once noted that sometimes metaphors 
need some “scraping . . . off” and refurbishing.7  This is not one of those 
cases.  There is little value to the cat’s paw metaphor.  It should not be 
refurbished, but retired. 
The next section of this Article provides the necessary background for 
understanding how cat’s paw doctrine initially developed.  Section III 
demonstrates that cat’s paw does not perform the traditional functions of 
metaphor.  Section IV shows it is impossible to use the cat’s paw idea to 
reason by analogy because the cat’s paw fable is too dissimilar to 
discrimination cases.  Section V explores how the fable has infected the 
doctrine as judges draw meaning from the fable itself, rather than the text, 
history, or purposes of the underlying discrimination statutes. 
 
 5  E.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) 
(“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, 
they end often by enslaving it.”).  
 6  See, e.g., Acosta v. Brain, 910 F.3d 502, 514 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying cat’s paw in 
ERISA retaliation context); Perkins v. Child Care Assocs., No. 17-11096, 2018 WL 
5046255, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) (applying it to the FMLA); Chattman v. Toho Tenax 
Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 351 (6th Cir. 2012) (Title VII and ADA); Simmons v. Sykes 
Enterprises, Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011) (ADEA). 
 7  Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Judge Richard Posner introduced the term cat’s paw into employment 
discrimination jurisprudence in Shager v. Upjohn Co.8  Despite the later 
significance of this new term of art, Shager contains only a passing 
reference to cat’s paw and does not even describe the fable on which the 
term is based. 
Later cases would fill in this gap.  In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the 
Seventh Circuit opined: 
One would guess that the chances are pretty slim that the work of 
a 17th century French poet would find its way into a Chicago 
courtroom in 2009. But that’s the situation in this case as we try 
to make sense out of what has been dubbed the “cat’s paw” 
theory. The term derives from the fable “The Monkey and the 
Cat” penned by Jean de La Fontaine (1621–1695). In the tale, a 
clever—and rather unscrupulous—monkey persuades an 
unsuspecting feline to snatch chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns 
her paw in the process while the monkey profits, gulping down 
the chestnuts one by one. As understood today, a cat’s paw is a 
“tool” or “one used by another to accomplish his purposes.”9 
At least in its original form, the term “cat’s paw” described a situation 
in which an unbiased individual takes an action against a worker based on 
input from a biased individual.  Shager held that the employer could be 
liable for discrimination in these circumstances. 
A.  The Federal Discrimination Statutes 
As currently conceived, cat’s paw purports to describe a subset of 
employment discrimination cases.  Title VII is the cornerstone federal 
employment discrimination statute.  Title VII prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against a worker because of race, sex, national origin, color, 
or religion.10  Title VII’s main operative provision consists of two subparts.  
Under the first subpart, it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to do the following: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin[.]11 
 
 8  Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 9  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 562 U.S. 411 
(2011). 
 10  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 11  Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
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Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to do 
the following: 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 
These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.13  The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act contains similar main language,14 and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act contains similar concepts, although not 
always stated in the same language.15 
B.  Cat’s Paw at the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court formally recognized the cat’s paw concept in 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital.16  In Staub, the plaintiff Vincent Staub sued his 
employer for terminating his employment, alleging the employer violated 
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA).17  USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating or 
retaliating against service members based on their military service.18  Staub 
worked as an angio technician at a hospital.  He was also a member of the 
Army Reserve.  As an Army Reservist, Staub would miss work for training 
and deployments, often on the weekends.  After working for the hospital 
for 14 years, the hospital terminated his employment.  Staub filed suit, 
arguing that the hospital provided false reasons for firing him and that the 
real reason was animosity toward his military service. 
There was no evidence that the person who decided to fire Staub took 
his military service into account when making the decision.  However, 
Staub presented evidence that the decision was influenced by information 
from two supervisors who arguably did possess such bias.19 
 
 12  Id. § 2000e-2(a).  
 13  Congress amended Title VII in 1991.  However, this does not change the fact that the 
foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 14  29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
 15  42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
 16  562 U.S. 411 (2011). Professor Sullivan examines the broader implications of Staub 
and cat’s paw doctrine in Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012). 
 17  562 U.S. at 415–16.  This section recounts the facts as described by the courts.  The 
employer contested many of the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them. 
 18  38 U.S.C. § 4311. 
 19  Staub, 562 U.S. at 422. By describing the facts of this case, I am not suggesting that 
a person is required to act with animus or intent to create liability under federal 
discrimination law. 
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A jury heard Staub’s case and awarded him $57,640.00 in damages.20  
The employer filed post-trial motions.  In considering post-trial motions, 
the trial court noted that “the testimony and documentation about who said 
what to whom was hotly contested.”21 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on its jurisprudence requiring 
that the biased subordinate have a singular influence over the 
decisionmaker.22  If the decisionmaker did not just rely on the information 
provided by the subordinate, but conducted her own investigation and 
analysis, there could be no cat’s paw liability in the Seventh Circuit.23  In 
ruling on the case, the Seventh Circuit re-described the cat’s paw fable and 
specifically invoked the fable in describing the legal standard it created.24 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Staub to resolve a circuit split 
regarding the proper standard in cat’s paw cases.25  The Supreme Court 
upheld the use of cat’s paw doctrine and enunciated a test to apply in some 
circumstances.  The Court only briefly refers to the fable in a footnote.26  
This does not mean that the fable played no role in the case.  One of the 
most insidious features of cat’s paw doctrine, as discussed below, is the 
idea that cat’s paw is somehow different than other kinds of discrimination 
cases.  Once the Supreme Court recognized these cases as somehow 
different than other cases, it created a legal standard to apply to them that is 
different than the legal standard the Court uses to describe cases that do not 
fall within the cat’s paw concept. 
After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court provided the text of 
USERRA and noted its similarity to Title VII.27  The Court’s analysis 
began with the statement: “[W]e start from the premise that when Congress 
creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law.”28  The 
Court then applied a tort law overlay to USERRA. 
 
 20  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 7, 
2008).   
 21  Id. at *2. 
 22  Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 562 U.S. 411 
(2011). 
 23  It is worth noting that there is no reference to any statutory language in the Seventh 
Circuit’s description of cat’s paw doctrine. 
 24  Staub, 560 F.3d at 650, 656. 
 25  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, Docket 
No 09-400, *9 (US filed Mar 16, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 3611711) 
(“Staub Amicus Brief”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 851, 927 (2014). 
 26  Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 416, n.1 (2011). 
 27  Id. at 416–17. 
 28  Id. I have critiqued the Supreme Court’s purported use of tort law in other work.  
Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014); Sandra F. Sperino, 
Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
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The Court stated that intent requires a person to intend the 
consequences of his actions or believe that consequences are substantially 
certain to occur.29  It noted that even if the allegedly biased supervisors 
acted with discriminatory animus, they did not terminate Staub.  Instead, 
they reported performance deficiencies.  Staub presented evidence that he 
had not violated any workplace rules and that the reporting was motivated 
by his military obligations. 
Because reporting performance problems does not itself violate 
USERRA, no liability attached for the making of those reports.  The Court 
assumed that submitting a negative performance review is not cognizable 
on its own under USERRA.  In discrimination jurisprudence, there is a 
continuing circuit split about this issue.30 
The Court continued by deciding whether the hospital could be held 
liable for the animus and actions of the two subordinate supervisors.  It 
stated: “Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory motive of one of the 
employer’s agents . . . can be aggregated with the act of another agent  . . . 
to impose liability on Proctor.”31  The Court discussed various views on 
agency law and then somehow resolved the agency issue through causation.  
The Court stated: 
Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what 
the background rule of agency law may be, since the former line 
of authority is suggested by the governing text, which requires 
that discrimination be “a motivating factor” in the adverse 
action. When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus 
on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report 
prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, 
discrimination might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal 
factor” in the decision; but it seems to us a considerable stretch 
to call it “a motivating factor.”32 
The lower courts are still struggling with questions about whether 
cat’s paw doctrine is about causation, agency, or both causation and 
agency.  The Supreme Court rejected the standard suggested by the 
employer, that the employer is only liable if the decisionmaker possessed 
discriminatory animus.33 
 
 29  Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 & 422 n.3.  
 30  See, e.g., Taylor v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, 
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory performance not 
sufficient to constitute an adverse action); Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F. Supp. 2d 336, 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that a negative evaluation can be an adverse action if it leads to 
a material adverse change in work conditions). 
 31  Staub, 562 U.S. at 418. 
 32  Id. at 418–19. 
 33  Id. at 419. 
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The Court also discussed how the decisionmaker’s exercise of 
independent judgment or an investigation might affect cat’s paw.34  It 
specifically held that the independent judgment of a decisionmaker does 
not break the causal chain. The Court purported to address this problem 
through proximate cause jurisprudence.35 
The Court continued by noting that the decisionmaker’s judgment is a 
proximate cause of the decision, but provided that the common law allows 
for multiple proximate causes.36  It also indicated that the judgment is not a 
superceding cause because superceding cause only exists if it is a “cause of 
independent origin that was not foreseeable.”37  
The Court held that the mere fact that an investigation occurred did 
not relieve the employer of liability.  “The employer is at fault because one 
of its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was 
intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment 
decision.”38  The Court also noted: “Since a supervisor is an agent of the 
employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer 
causes it; and when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it 
is a ‘motivating factor in the employer’s action,’ precisely as the text 
requires.”39 
The Court left room for an investigation to break the causal chain, in 
very limited circumstances.  It held that the employer’s investigation must 
be “unrelated” to the supervisor’s original biased action.40  The Court also 
noted that under USERRA, the defendant would be required to prove the 
causal break.41  The biased report would remain a factor “if the independent 
investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse 
action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely 
justified.”42 
The Court ultimately held: “[I]f a supervisor performs an act 
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause 
an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the 
 
 34  By using the term independent, the author is repeating the terminology used by the 
Court.  In many cases, once a biased individual reports that a worker has performance or 
other problems, it is difficult to determine how a subsequent negative action could be truly 
independent of the information received from the biased individual.   
 35  Staub, 562 U.S. at 419–20. 
 36  Id.  
 37  Id at 420. (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 38  Id. at 421. 
 39  Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011). 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id.  
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ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”43  
Turning to the facts of the Staub case, the Court held that the facts 
presented could meet the new standard.  The Court remanded the case to 
the Seventh Circuit to determine whether the jury’s verdict should be 
reinstated or whether a new trial should be granted. 
The Court explicitly noted that it was not deciding a number of 
questions related to cat’s paw.  It did not decide what should happen if the 
subordinate supervisor intended one outcome, but a different outcome 
resulted from a process the subordinate supervisor started in motion.44  It 
also did not decide whether liability would occur if a co-worker (rather 
than a supervisor) possessed the required bias.45 
III.  CAT’S PAW AS METAPHOR GENERALLY 
In Shager, Judge Posner used the term “cat’s paw” and simply stated 
that the employer could be liable for employment discrimination in these 
scenarios.46  Thus, an employer could be liable if a biased subordinate gave 
false information to a decisionmaker and that decisionmaker took a 
negative action against a worker based on the biased information.  If judges 
limited “cat’s paw” to Shager, this Article would be unnecessary.  
Unfortunately, the cat’s paw idea has spawned an entire body of confusing 
doctrine that is unmoored from the underlying federal discrimination 
statutes. 
Given this, it is important to determine whether cat’s paw even works 
as metaphor at a basic level.  Metaphor often serves a stylistic function in 
cases.  It can often be a clever turn of phrase that is repeated because of its 
stylishness.  The concept of cat’s paw certainly serves this function.  The 
phrase has been used numerous times by courts over the last two decades. 
Cat’s paw gets high style points, but fares less well in other areas.  
Indeed, other than providing a clever turn of phrase, cat’s paw does not 
perform any of the traditional functions of metaphor.  Judges often use 
metaphor to make an abstract concept more concrete.  For example, First 
Amendment jurisprudence uses the “marketplace of ideas” concept and 
constitutional criminal law relies on the metaphor of the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.” 
Cat’s paw does not serve this function.  Cat’s paw is not describing an 
abstract concept.  Instead, it gives a new name to a fairly understandable set 
of facts.  One person sets in motion a chain of events because of the 
 
 43  Id. at 422. 
 44  Id. at 420 n.2.  This footnote is especially confusing because it uses the concept of 
intent, but the footnote references a portion of the Restatement relating to negligence law. 
 45  Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 n.4 (2011).  
 46  Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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worker’s protected trait, typically by giving negative information to an 
unbiased individual.  The unbiased individual then takes a negative action 
against the worker. 
Prior to Posner giving a name to this set of facts, courts adjudicated 
these kinds of cases all of the time without any need for the term cat’s 
paw.47  Indeed, portions of current cat’s paw doctrine contradict established 
Supreme Court case law regarding how to prove discrimination claims.48  
The courts are failing to see these contradictions because the Supreme 
Court did not label these earlier cases under the heading of cat’s paw. 
The term cat’s paw does express, in a sort of shorthand, a concept.  
Even giving the concept a name is problematic because it suggests that 
there is something separate or different about cat’s paw cases.  Indeed, 
many of the current problems with cat’s paw jurisprudence relate to the fact 
that the courts have carved it out as a separate area without describing how 
it fits within the larger jurisprudence.  Using the fable and the title “cat’s 
paw” suggests that there is something different, and perhaps something 
more complicated, about these cases.  After all, why use a fancy fable if the 
concept is not particularly difficult? 
Cat’s paw does not make the law more accessible by allowing lay 
readers to better understand the law.49  The cat’s paw story is not one that is 
commonly known or salient in popular culture.  When I teach Employment 
Discrimination, most of my students have never heard of the fable of “The 
Monkey and the Cat,” and we spend class time discussing the fable. 
The limits of metaphor in the law are well documented.50  “Even the 
most suspect metaphors may become embedded in judicial precedent and 
affect judicial reasoning.”51 Justice Cardozo famously warned, 
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to 
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”52  Others have voiced 
suspicion of judicial reliance on metaphorical expression.  Justice 
Rehnquist was skeptical about the use of the “wall of separation” metaphor, 
referring to it as “Jefferson’s misleading metaphor,”65 and asserted that the 
metaphor “has proved useless as a guide to judging [Bill of Rights issues].”  
 
 47  See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003); Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989). 
 48  I explore this concept in detail in Sandra F. Sperino, Caught by the Cat’s Paw, __ 
BYU L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2020). 
 49  Robert L. Tsai, Democracy’s Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006).   
 50  Stephanie A. Gore, ”A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for 
New Technologies, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 403, 414 (2013) (discussing 
limits). 
 51  Gore, supre note 50,  at 414. 
 52  Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
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There is also a concern about deriving law from figures of speech or 
metaphor, rather than deriving law from concepts actually contained in the 
legal document the court is interpreting.53 The courts have not been 
attentive to these limits as they articulate cat’s paw doctrine. 
A few courts have noted the problematic nature of cat’s paw doctrine.  
One court noted that cat’s paw jurisprudence suffered when the metaphor is 
taken “too literally.”54  The court noted that such claims should be 
“[s]tripped of their metaphors” because the court saw no reason to limit 
claims to those that closely resemble the metaphors that “imaginative 
lawyers and judges have developed.”55 
The Seventh Circuit has chided itself for the existing confusion within 
the jurisprudence, with Judge Posner authoring an opinion calling cat’s paw 
doctrine a judicial attractive nuisance.56  The Court also noted: “This is all a 
dreadful muddle, for which we appellate judges must accept some blame 
because doctrine stated as metaphor, such as the ‘cat’s paw’ theory of 
liability, which we introduced into employment discrimination law 
in Shager v. Upjohn Co.”57  In Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,58 Judge Posner noted, 
“The formula was (obviously) not intended to be taken literally . . .  and 
were it taken even semi-literally it would be inconsistent with the normal 
analysis of causal issues in tort litigation.” 
Unfortunately, most courts continue to robustly use the cat’s paw 
concept without expressly or implicitly recognizing the problems involved 
in using metaphors generally or the fact that the cat’s paw metaphor does 
not perform most of the traditional functions of metaphor. 
IV.  CAT’S PAW DOES NOT EXPLAIN REAL WORKPLACES 
Metaphor may also help a reader to understand a concept through a 
form of analogic reasoning.59  The metaphor helps the reader to understand 
similarities between the metaphor and the legal concept and can provide 
new insights about the legal concept.60 In this respect, cat’s paw fails 
miserably.  Strangely, the fable does not describe what is happening in a 
“cat’s paw” scenario. 
 
 
 53  People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 
Champaign Cty., Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 54  E.E.O.C. v. BCI Coca–Cola Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 55  Id.  
 56  Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 57  Id. 
 58  383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 59  Oldfather, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
 60  Id.  
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Let’s return to the fable.  The wily monkey tricks the cat into 
obtaining chestnuts and then absconds with them.  When courts try to apply 
the fable, at times they cannot even figure out which entity or person the 
cat represents.  All courts agree that the monkey is supposed to represent 
the biased individual.  Some courts have stated that the cat is the unbiased 
supervisor.61  Others have stated that the cat is the employer.62  The Second 
Circuit has described cat’s paw as follows: “In other words, by merely 
effectuating or ‘rubber-stamp[ing]’ a discriminatory employee’s ‘unlawful 
design,’ the employer plays the credulous cat to the malevolent monkey 
and, in so doing, allows itself to get burned—i.e., successfully sued.”63 
Knowing whether the cat is the individual decisionmaker or the 
employer is important in federal discrimination cases.  As discussed below, 
under federal discrimination law, the employer (and not typically the 
individual decisionmaker) is the entity liable for discrimination. 
Even overcoming this basic problem does not revive cat’s paw’s 
usefulness.  In the cat’s paw fable, there are two actors: a monkey and a 
cat.  In the fable, the monkey is not part of a larger organization.  The 
monkey is acting on its own and for its own purposes, and the monkey is 
not constrained or emboldened by the formal policies or informal norms of 
a larger organization.  The monkey and the cat have no legal relationship 
with one another.  The monkey does not have any particular power over the 
cat, such as the power inherent in employment relationships. 
This is very different than what cat’s paw cases actually look like.  In 
all cat’s paw cases there are at least four identifiable actors in a legal sense: 
a “biased” person, an “unbiased” decisionmaker, the employer, and the 
worker affected by the bias.  If the biased person is the monkey and the 
unbiased decisionmaker is the cat, the fable tells us nothing about the 
employer’s liability or the duties owed to the worker. 
Indeed, the most striking feature of the cat’s paw fable is that it leaves 
out two of the key players in discrimination suits: the employer and the 
worker alleging injury.  The federal discrimination statutes are supposed to 
protect certain workers from discrimination based on a protected trait.  
Unfortunately, the cat’s paw fable does not even include the worker in the 
metaphor.  In the fable, the cat is harmed because he follows the requests of 
 
 61  Diaz v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 643 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Indeed, the 
theory is premised on a biased subordinate—the monkey who effects his discriminatory 
intentions through the unbiased cat’s paw.”). 
 62  E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the 
employer Ford would be the cat in the scenario, but evidence did not support); see also 
Macknet v. Univ. of Pa., No. CV 15-5321, 2017 WL 4102829, at *5, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 
2017). 
 63  Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(citation omitted) (also using the word manipulated). 
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the wily monkey.  In a cat’s paw scenario, the worker who is subjected to 
biased decisionmaking is the person who can seek the legal remedy under 
the federal discrimination statutes.  When courts use the cat’s paw fable, 
they do not describe the worker as the harmed person. A more apt fable 
would go something like this: a wily monkey gets a cat to harm a third 
animal and then a fourth entity is liable for the monkey’s conduct.  
Omitting the worker from the metaphor is a fatal flaw.  This, alone, should 
be a sufficient reason to retire the metaphor. 
Most courts view the two actors in the cat’s paw as the biased 
individual and the unbiased supervisor.  The worker is left out of this story, 
but so is the employer.  This is important because the employer is the entity 
that employs the worker and is legally responsible under federal 
discrimination law.  The fable tells courts nothing about whether and why 
the employer should be held liable for the interaction between the biased 
and the unbiased individual.  In the fable, the monkey is acting for his own 
ends.  When the monkey acts in the fable, the monkey is not subject to 
corporate policies or external legal constraints. 
More importantly, in the fable, the monkey is not held accountable for 
its conduct.  The harm falls on the cat, and the monkey gets away with its 
misconduct.  The lack of accountability in the fable is a strong reason to 
refuse to apply it in the context of the federal discrimination statutes. 
The fable is also too simple in many other respects.  In the fable, there 
is one monkey and one cat.  Even if we assume that the cat is supposed to 
represent the unbiased decisionmaker, the fable does not describe well what 
happens in real workplaces.  Many “cat’s paw” cases involve decisions 
made after input from multiple people, some biased, some not, and some 
perhaps influenced by the biased information.64  Cat’s paw cases often 
involve multiple levels of review or the input of a human relations 
department.  Some cat’s paw cases involve multi-member decision-making 
bodies. 
In addition, the monkey carries out one act in isolation.  In many 
discrimination cases, the plaintiff will present cat’s paw evidence, but may 
also present additional evidence suggesting discrimination occurred.  
Calling a case a cat’s paw case highlights and isolates this form of evidence 
and separates it from other kinds of evidence the plaintiff might use to 
prove discrimination. 
Finally, the fable does not illuminate any legal concept that the courts 
have used to discuss cat’s paw: legal cause, factual cause, intent, or agency.  
Indeed, none of these concepts inform the underlying fable.  As discussed 
 
 64  Kregler v. City of New York, 987 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing 
the problem when the biased individual influences the decisionmaker through 
intermediaries). 
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later in this Article, it is difficult to apply these concepts within the 
confines of the cat’s paw fable. 
V.  KILLING THE CAT’S PAW 
Judges should kill the cat’s paw for three reasons.  First, other than 
providing a stylish label, cat’s paw does not perform the traditional 
functions of metaphor.  The fable is not well known, and it does not make 
an abstract concept more concrete.  Second, the fable cannot serve as the 
basis of analogic reasoning because it does not even remotely describe 
what happens in the workplace.  Finally, judges are actually looking to the 
fable to understand discrimination law, instead of relying on the text, 
history, and purposes of the underlying federal discrimination law. 
Since Staub, the federal district and appellate courts have defined 
cat’s paw doctrine in problematic ways.  One source of these problems is 
the courts’ constant reference to the cat’s paw fable itself.  As the 
jurisprudence develops, the cat’s paw fable itself continues to shape the 
doctrine.  Courts have both explicitly and implicitly relied on concepts 
from the fable to decide cases.  This happens even when the statutory text 
and purposes do not rely on the same concepts.  As this section shows, 
courts are often requiring litigants to prove elements that are not required 
by the federal anti-discrimination statutes, but which instead are drawn 
from the fable. 
The Second Circuit recited that the phrase “cat’s paw” “derives from 
an Aesop fable, later put into verse by Jean de La Fontaine.”65  In the fable, 
“a wily monkey flatters a naïve cat into pulling roasting chestnuts out of a 
roaring fire for their mutual satisfaction; the monkey, however, 
‘devour[s] . . . them fast,’ leaving the cat ‘with a burnt paw and no 
chestnuts’ for its trouble.”66 
The fable centers on the guile of the monkey, the monkey’s 
malevolent plan, the naivety of the cat, and the fact that the monkey tricks 
the cat into getting the chestnuts.  This language has worked its way into 
lower court iterations of cat’s paw, with lower courts often using the fable 
to insert extra requirements into the cat’s paw jurisprudence.67  Courts 
repeatedly incorporate three ideas from the fable into discrimination law.  
Courts have asserted that cat’s paw involves: (1) the concept of the 
 
 65  Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 271–72. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 832 (7th Cir. 2018) (using words “dupe” and 
“deliberate scheme”); Tshibaka v. Sernulka, 673 F. App’x 272, 281 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2017); Thomas v. Berry Plastics 
Corp., 803 F.3d 510, 515 (10th Cir. 2015); Hervey v. Miss. Dep’t of Educ., 404 F. App’x 
865, 871–72 (5th Cir. 2010). 
SPERINO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020  12:32 PM 
2020] KILLING THE CAT’S PAW 1317 
unbiased individual being a “dupe;” (2) the idea that the biased individual 
is engaging in a “deliberate scheme,”68 or the biased individual “us[ing]” or 
“intentionally manipulate[ing]” the unbiased individual; and (3) the idea 
that one actor must be manipulating another person and that manipulation 
must directly translate into an outcome.69 
The Eighth Circuit described cat’s paw theory as applying “‘[i]n the 
employment discrimination context . . . [when] a biased subordinate, who 
lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a 
deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.’”70  
Appellate courts have also cited to dictionary or other definitions of the 
term cat’s paw, which relates to “one used by another as a tool.”71  The 
Second Circuit has described cat’s paw as a case where the employer 
rubberstamps a “discriminatory employee’s ‘unlawful design.’”72  Other 
courts have used the term “malevolent intent” to describe the motives of 
the biased supervisor.73 
One court used the concept of a “dupe” to preclude liability.  In the 
case, an allegedly biased individual gave the plaintiff negative performance 
reviews that were later used to fire him during a reduction in force.74  The 
court reasoned that cat’s paw liability could not attach in such a case 
because the supervisor did not know about the possibility of the reduction 
in force at the time he gave the performance reviews; therefore, the 
supervisor could not dupe anyone.75 
Some courts incorporate the concept of a dupe in a slightly different 
way.  They articulate cat’s paw analysis as establishing liability “if the 
plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker merely ‘followed the biased 
recommendation [of a non-decisionmaker] without independently 
 
 68  See, e.g., Tuttle v. Baptist Health Med. Grp., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 622, 632 (E.D. 
Ky. 2019); McGaha v. Orion Sec. Sols., L.L.C., No. CIV-17-1290-G, 2019 WL 1212933, at 
*7 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2019); McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, 343 F. Supp. 3d 
753, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 69  Smith v. City of Madison, Miss., 364 F. Supp. 3d 656, 659 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2018); 
Marshall v. Rawlings Co., LLC, No. 3:14-CV-00359-TBR, 2018 WL 3745832, at *4 (W.D. 
Ky. Aug. 7, 2018). 
 70  Singer v. Harris, 897 F.3d 970, 978–79 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Qamhiyah v. Iowa 
State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 566 F.3d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 2009)); see also Robinson v. 
Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 832 (7th Cir. 2018) (using similar articulation). 
 71  Gollas v. Univ. Of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. At Houston, 425 F. App’x 318, 325 (5th Cir. 
2011) (citing to dictionary).   
 72  Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 117 (2d Cir. 2011)) (also using the word 
“manipulates”). 
 73  Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 74  Cherry v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., 829 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 75  Id.  
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investigating the complaint against the employee.’”76  Or the court 
indicates that the employer is only liable if the employer “uncritically relies 
on the biased subordinate’s reports and recommendations in deciding to 
take adverse employment action.”77  Strangely, many of these cases seem 
to directly contradict the Supreme Court’s holdings in Staub related to the 
effects of independent judgment and investigations.78 
Additionally, in the fable, the monkey directly influences the cat.  
Some courts have added this idea in the doctrine.  For example, one court 
described cat’s paw noting that the plaintiff would show that “‘those 
exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision 
to terminate’ him.”79  This language suggests that the biased person must 
influence someone.  There are scenarios where the biased individual simply 
puts a negative evaluation in file, but does not reach out to influence 
another human being.  While this difference does not affect the harm done 
to the plaintiff or the reason for the harm, some case law implies that the 
biased person must somehow influence another person. 
When the courts use the fable as part of legal doctrine, they import 
concepts that are not part of the federal discrimination statutes, their 
underlying policies, or even the Staub case.  Inserting these new words and 
concepts into cat’s paw doctrine risks further confusing an already messy 
jurisprudence.  Consider again the three concepts that courts often import 
from the fable: that the unbiased individual is a dupe; that the biased 
individual engaged in a deliberate scheme or a malevolent one, and that the 
biased individual must directly influence another individual. 
The Staub holding does not require the formal decisionmaker to be a 
dupe, nor does it require a “deliberate scheme” or intentional manipulation.  
Indeed, one striking feature of post-Staub cases is circuit courts’ tendency 
to cite to their own circuit’s or other circuits’ articulations of cat’s paw 
(including pre-Staub versions of the test), rather than relying primarily on 
Staub.80 
 
 
 76  Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App’x 936, 942 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Stimpson v. 
City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 77  Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp., Inc., 897 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 78  See generally supra Section II. 
 79  Greenawalt v. Clarion Cty., 459 F. App’x 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Abramson 
v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001)).  But see Marshall v. 
Rawlings Co., LLC, 854 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2017) (allowing liability in the FMLA context 
even with multiple levels of review). 
 80  See, e.g., Dolan v. Penn Millers Ins. Co., 625 F. App’x 91, 94 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(citing Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (another circuit)); 
Greenawalt, 459 F. App’x at 169 (citing Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 
F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001)) (2001 case from same circuit). 
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The discrimination statutes require that the plaintiff establish a causal 
link between a protected trait and an outcome,81 but do not require that 
causal link to be established through intentional manipulation or a devious 
scheme.  The Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII liability can 
occur even if the person thought they were acting to help or protect the 
plaintiff.82  Indeed, several Supreme Court cases approve of employer 
liability when the plaintiff shows that discriminatory actions or comments 
caused a negative outcome, but without directly connecting who 
specifically engaged in such conduct and exactly how and who that conduct 
impacted later in the decisional process.83 
The cat’s paw fable does not assist the courts in analyzing questions 
related to causation.  Instead, it complicates those inquiries.  In the fable, 
the monkey makes a request to the cat, and the cat immediately responds 
and suffers harm.  There are only two actors, and it is fairly clear what 
happens.  Thus, there are no questions about factual cause. 
Employment discrimination scenarios in the real world look very 
different than the simple scenario posed by the fable.  As discussed earlier, 
the monkey and the cat are individual actors.  The monkey is acting based 
on its own desires.  The monkey is not part of a larger organization, and the 
monkey and the cat have no legal relationship with one another in the fable.  
In the fable, there are only two actors and there is no distance in either 
time, space, or motivation between the monkey’s plan and the negative 
outcome. 
All cat’s paw scenarios are more complicated than the fable because 
they involve the employer and the worker, in addition to the biased 
individual and the unbiased one.  Many cat’s paw scenarios are even more 
complex in that they add even more actors (multi-member bodies, multiple 
levels of supervisory review, an HR department).84  Many cat’s paw cases 
involve attenuation in that the biased individual’s comments or conduct are 
removed in time or space from the final outcome.  Some cat’s paw cases 
also involve some attempt by the employer’s agent to investigate the 
information provided by the biased individual. 
Given these differences, labeling something as “cat’s paw” reveals 
very little about the appropriate causal outcome.  Some cat’s paw cases 
easily meet a factual cause requirement and others do not.  For example, 
 
 81  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (not using the term “intent”). 
 82  Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1991). 
 83  See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003); Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989). 
 84  E.g., Murphy v. Radnor Twp., 604 F. App’x 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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consider a situation where a clearly biased individual provides negative 
information about an employee.  Thirty other people, who do not know the 
biased individual and who do not know about the information he provides, 
also provide negative information about the employee’s performance.  The 
input received from the biased individual is fairly minor compared to the 
complaints of the other thirty people, and the biased individual is a non-
influential co-worker.  Based on the input of all thirty-one people, the 
employee’s supervisor (who also exhibits no bias) decides to fire him.  In 
such a scenario, it is very unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to 
establish the factual cause standard, which varies by statute.85  Importantly, 
the inability to establish causation has very little to do with the fact that this 
scenario technically falls under the label of a “cat’s paw” case.  Indeed, 
labeling this scenario as cat’s paw performs no work in determining factual 
cause.  Importantly for the current jurisprudence, cat’s paw doctrine and the 
fable itself tell courts absolutely nothing about where to draw the line on 
more difficult factual cause questions. 
Nor is the fable helpful to any agency analysis.  This fable does not 
capture the dynamics that exist when the unbiased individual and the biased 
individual work for the same employer.  It does not recognize that the 
employer faces liability under the employment discrimination statutes.  The 
fable contains no basis upon which to ground a theory of liability for the 
employer.  Nor does it instruct courts on what to do when both the monkey 
and the cat work in a complex environment, governed by employer 
practices.  For example, the fable tells us nothing about the employer’s 
liability when it investigates the facts alleged by the biased individual. 
The most significant harm created by the cat’s paw fable is that it 
suggests that cat’s paw cases are somehow separate from the rest of 
employment discrimination law and that causation and agency issues 
should somehow work differently in this subset of cases.  Requiring a court 
to first determine whether it has a cat’s paw case and then applying notions 
of factual cause and agency specific to that subset of cases is problematic.  
Nothing in the employment discrimination statutes suggests that cat’s paw 
cases require a separate analysis, and the statutes do not contain a separate 
cat’s paw provision.  And, as if one name were not enough, courts have 
also started to give additional names to “cat’s paw,” calling it “rubber 
stamp” liability and “subordinate bias.”86  Some courts appear to 
 
 85  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 
338, 342 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 86  Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp., Inc., 897 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2018).  Referring 
to cat’s paw cases as “rubber stamp” cases is problematic because not all cat’s paw 
scenarios involve the decisionmaker “rubber stamping” a biased individual’s 
recommendation.  For example, in the Staub case itself, one of the subordinate supervisor’s 
wrote a negative performance review without any specific recommendation.  Referring to 
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differentiate cat’s paw from rubber stamp liability.87  Some courts have 
referred to cat’s paw as creating vicarious liability.88  These sub-names 
increase the confusion about cat’s paw. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is time to kill the cat’s paw.  The concept does not perform any of 
the traditional functions of metaphor, other than providing a flashy name.  
The underlying fable does not accurately represent employment scenarios 
in many ways.  Most importantly, the fable does not describe the worker or 
the employer, the two main actors in discrimination cases.  Especially 
problematic is the fact that at the end of the fable, the monkey gets away 
with his misdeed.  There is no remedy provided.  Unfortunately, the cat’s 
paw fable has infected employment discrimination law.  It does not help the 
courts analyze issues related to causation, intent, or agency.  Instead, it only 
provides another lawyer of complexity to an already confused 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
cat’s paw cases as subordinate bias cases is sometimes inaccurate because the bias may not 
come from the subordinate of the decisionmaker.  For example, an HR manager could 
possess the required bias. For a discussion of subordinate bias liability, see Theresa M. 
Beiner, Subordinate Bias Liability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 89 (2012). 
 87  McGaha v. Orion Sec. Sols., L.L.C., No. CIV-17-1290-G, 2019 WL 1212933, at *7 
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2019). 
 88  Liles v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 851 F.3d 810, 820 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bennett v. 
Riceland Foods, Inc., 721 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2013)).  Referring to cat’s paw cases as 
vicarious liability cases is also inaccurate in many cases.  In some instances, the employer’s 
own action or inaction contributed to bias and impacted the outcome. 
